Pronto*

Reflections on APSA-TLC

2010-02-08T20:16:24Z

Got back from the APSA Teaching & Learning Conference in Philadelphia last night. In addition to my conference duties, I also got to spend some time catching up w/ my little brother (Andy/Andrés), a lovely dinner w/ Jake & Megan, as well as meeting (in person) my Twitter friend Ari (who teaches political theory at UN-Lincoln). But let me focus here on the teaching conference.]]> only a third of what we do, right?). But even when some of the paper presentations are less-than-inspirational, I have both times managed to walk away w/ an interesting nugget or two that I think will improve my teaching. The conference is broken up into “track” workshops that stick together throughout the weekend, except when we are free to break up for elective “open” workshop presentations. I was in the research methods track, where we spent much of our time discussing better ways to teach methods and/or to assess how well our students learn what we think we teach them. Here’s the two most interesting papers from my track sessions. One was by Shane Ralston, a philosopher teaching in an MPA program at PSU-Hazleton. Because his course was aimed at preparing people who will work in public policy (not “research”), he crafted his course around the idea of solving practical problems. To do so, he used the American philosopher John Dewey, who made a clear distinction between empiricism and scientism. I found the talk intriguing. The most memorable moment was when an older professor from Morehouse chuckled, because he had been a PhD student decades ago under David Truman. Turns out Truman, one of the fathers of American behavioralism began all his research methods courses by using Dewey. Another was by Daniel Esser, methods professor at American University’s SIS (School of International Studies). He had given his current-semester students a pre-test to determine their disciplinary background & methods proficiency. He suggested that faculty could embrace the “disciplinary diversity” of students. One idea was to reconsider what methods students already were familiar with—and which would be more likely to be useful in their future careers. The other was to team up students w/ diverse backgrounds so that students could help each other to master different kinds of methods. While he thought this probably applied primarily to similar masters’ programs, I thought this could easily apply to undergraduate programs as well (especially if the methods course regularly served a variety of non-majors or if the course is part of an interdisciplinary major). The two elective workshops I attended were also quite useful. In the first, two faculty members from Indiana University of Pennsylvania (Dighton Fiddner & David Chambers) walked us through an amazing quasi-experiment they did at their campus. As a way to show students how the research process is non-linear (there are a lot of fits & starts), they set up a room w/ a multidisciplinary group of experts on a topic (in their case, cyber terrorism) who debated potential policy/research options. The students had real time access (though a variety of cameras) to the day-long discussion, and were able to see how difficult it was for a roomful of PhDs to come up w/ a research question. I’m not sure how easily that kind of model can be replicated, but it does suggest a number of possibilities. The other was a workshop on “learning communities” (a current buzzword in academia). The presenter was Juan Carlos Huerta, the director of learning communities at UT Corpus Christi. Through a hands-on, clearly developed explanation of the process, I think I now have a very good idea of how to integrate this into future teaching. Hopefully, I can try it out in the near future in an interdisciplinary course, perhaps a field school? I would highly encourage other political scientists to consider attending the conference in the future. Yes, it’s less “rigorous” than the APSA annual meeting. But you do get a chance to meet some interesting folk who have good ideas about teaching. If nothing else, it’s a good chance to network in small setting & pick up tips to make your teaching better (which also means “easier”—providing more time to do research rather than pull your hair out over problems in the classroom). My paper was well received. I want to significantly rewrite it, of course. But it’s basically a manifesto & attempt at a practical guide on how to do research methods “across the curriculum” (in social sciences generally). But I’ll leave that for some other time.

Evo’s second inauguration

2010-01-22T21:40:58Z

The start of the new semester caught me more off-guard than I had expected (plus I foolishly took on too many side projects whose deadlines are next weekend), so I’ve not had time to post regularly (as was my intention). But I didn’t want to neglect the importance of the second presidential inauguration of Evo Morales. One of the things that fascinate me about Evo’s political trajectory is his ability to use symbolic politics so effectively. Previous political figures—including indigenous figures like Felipe Quispe—have done so in the past, of course. But the sheer scope of the spectacle (I use that word in its literal sense, not w/ any implied normative meaning) of the investment ceremony (which was grander, by all accounts) than his January 2006 inauguration are remarkable. In 2006 Evo’s pre-inaugural ceremony at Tiwanaku included blessings from Aymara yatiris (priests). This year, Evo was proclaimed the “spiritual leader” of Bolivia’s indigenous people. I wonder when we’ll see an ethnography or sociocultural study of how indigenous political ceremonies have been recreated in contemporary Bolivia? Once things settle down after the end of next week, I hope to start doing some preliminary analysis of the candidates for April’s regional & local elections. Those elections will set the tone for the future direction of Bolivia’s state.

Vacation over, back to work!

2010-01-14T17:59:24Z

Finally got around to posting a few holiday pictures online. It’s become obvious that I’m less likely to whip out my camera than I was a few years ago. In part, because K8 has a much better one. But then I also forget to look at her pictures (and she forgets to whip it out, too!). Yes, that probably makes us bad parents. ]]> Carnivale (billed as “authentic Nuevo Latino”—and it did live up to the promise). But the holiday break was much-needed, even if far too short. We got a white Christmas in Chicagoland, bracketed by two long drives (10+ hours). But we’re back home in Oxford, MS. Where we hit a cold snap in the 20s that sent the locals into a panic (which was fun to watch, until our pipes froze because they’re not used to below-freezing temps here). Now we’re ready for the next semester. K8 has been teaching a 2-week “intercession” course, so she’s got a head start on me there. I think I’ve all my things ready for next week, when I jump right into three courses: my “Heroes & Villains” course on populism in Latin America for the Croft Institute, a repeat of my first-year seminar on “Travel as a Method of Inquiry,” and an intro to comparative politics course for the Tupelo satellite campus. I’m particularly curious to see how the latter develops. I’m trying to get caught up w/ Bolivian politics as the country jumps right into the next election cycle—this time for local offices (department governors & legislators and municipal mayors & councils). And, of course, the interesting developments surrounding Manfred Reyes Villa (more on that later). In the meantime, however, I have to catch up w/ some much-neglected writing. Particularly a conference paper I’m presenting in two weeks in Philadelphia; it’s on preparing students to write senior theses (it’s hardly past the first draft stage—so let me get back to it).

Winter 2009 book recommendations

2009-12-17T05:08:06Z

Time again for my end-of-the-semester book recommendations! I try to make a short list of “fun” books to read at the end of every semester, which I send out to my current students. I post it here for former students & anyone else interested. I also welcome additional suggestions. Pronto* recommends book list. A number of these are waiting for me during the Christmas/New Years break (in between all the family activities, of course), although I've started poking at some of the essay collections.]]>

Latin American Politics exam

2009-12-07T20:33:44Z

Here are the long & short essay questions for my POL 321 (Politics of Latin American) final exam. Students got all exam questions last Monday to prepare. I will select the long essay & two short essays they will have to answer this Wednesday. The final is based on what we read since the second exam. The long exam questions are based on the Castañeda/Morales book, Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left. The short essay questions are based on three of the several articles they read. Long Essay I will select one of the following questions for you to answer. Aim for about 4-5 substantial paragraphs. 1. Originally (in his book before Leftovers), Castañeda suggested that there were two lefts in Latin America: a “responsible” (or “social-democratic”) and a “populist” left. Describe their differences, citing one example of each in your discussion. Be sure you spend equal time explaining what unites both figures (why they're both “leftists”) as well as what divides them (why one is “social democrat” and the other a “populist”). 2. Some of the authors in Leftovers disagree with Castañeda, arguing that it is too simplistic to divide Latin America into a “good” and a “bad” left. Elaborate on this critique (one Castañeda himself now shares) by citing two chapters in the book. In your answer, be sure you do two things: 1) explain how a particular case doesn't fit Castañeda's original dichotomy and 2) outline the alternate dimensions or concepts that should be included in a typology of the left in Latin America. Short Essay I will select two of the following questions for you to answer. Aim for about 2-3 paragraphs per essay. 1. Roberts (“Latin America's Populist Revival”) attempts to define “populism” in ways that both complement and challenge Castañeda's discussion. How does Roberts define populism? And why does he criticize Castañeda? 2. Based on what you know after reading Latell (“Confronting Fidel's Legacy”), where does Cuba fit in Castañeda's model? [This is an “opinion” short essay. I am looking for a well-supported argument, not a “correct” answer.] 3. Barr (“Bolivia: Another Uncompleted Revolution”) discusses several factors that contributed to the election of Evo Morales. In what ways was Morales's rise “typical” to other cases we've studied this semester? What is the “uncompleted revolution” Barr writes about? In addition to these essay questions, they'll have five vocabulary terms, as well as be able to correctly match 10 heads of state (I give them the names) w/ their corresponding country.

Bolivia's election: a quick postmortem

2009-12-07T18:20:59Z

Official results aren't out yet. But here's what we know so far about yesterday's election in Bolivia: Evo Morales won (as expected), and by about the margin predicted in polls (I explain below). MAS also won majorities in both legislative chambers, but only managed a 2/3 supermajority (so far) in the upper chamber. The autonomy referendums were a smashing success, winning massively almost entirely across the board (reversing the 2005). But for all the celebration, there are some cautionary signs for MAS. Similarly, the opposition did poorly, but not nearly as poorly as many thought or predicted. I'll try to break it down below. 1. The pre-electoral polls were actually quite accurate Hardly anyone doubted that Evo would win reelection. All the polls gave him decisive margins over his nearest rival, Manfred Reyes Villa. The last polls (about a week before the election) gave Evo 55% & Manfred only 18%. So it seems that Evo's 63% victory “exceeded” poll expectations. If so, Manfred's 28% also exceeded expectations. So, what explains this discrepancy? Two things: undecided voters (in polls) & using “valid” votes (rather than total votes) as the basis for percent calculations. Well, many observers ignored the size of the undecideds in the pre-electoral polls. The last Ipsos pre-electoral poll had 15% of respondents undecided. If you include those who gave their preferences to other candidates in that poll (12% for split between Samuel Doria Medina & Rene Joaquino), you get a total “valid” polling figure of 85%. Using that as a base, the Ipsos poll suggested these figures: Evo 65%, Manfred 21%, SDM 12%, and Joaquino 2%. That suggests a few things: 1) Evo actually underperformed the poll (slightly, but w/in the margin of error); 2) Manfred actually overperformed the poll (by a more significant margin); and 3) voters continued to flee SDM & Joaquino, but most went to Manfred. 2. Manfred's results suggest polarization is entrenched No one expected Manfred to win, or even to make it a close enough race to make it into a second round runoff. Still, he outperformed many pollster's expectations. In the end, he did as well as Jorge Quiroga (Tuto) did in 2005. This suggests that a sizeable, consolidated chunk of the electorate is unreconciled w/ the “process of change” championed by Evo/MAS. Moreover, these voters are less likely to back a centrist candidate (like SDM) or an insitutionalized “traditional” party (these are now swept away). The standard bearer for the opposition is a conservative populist. This means that despite all the celebration of the “end of polarization,” we instead see an entrenchment of that polarization. The 28% of voters who backed Manfred aren't going to budge, and you can bet they'll do all they can to make Evo's second term as difficult as possible. 3. Don't be so quick to celebrate the MAS “supermajority” Yes, MAS seems to have secured a (slim) 2/3 supermajority in the Senate. But it failed to do so in the lower house (though it has a large majority). This gives Evo a lot of leverage compared to the last few years (when the opposition controlled the Senate). But let's not assume that MAS is a homogenous party w/ lockstep discipline. It's not, and it doesn't. Already in 2005-2009 MAS was plagued by a number of defections from its ranks. Currently, two MAS senators are “dissidents.” And a number of top-tier senate candidates were actively recruited by MAS from the middle class & intelligentsia to send signals to moderate voters. This worked, as a campaign strategy. But already Ana Maria Romero de Campero (Anamar) has proclaimed that she helped MAS increase its vote in La Paz. The middle class, liberal human rights activist is unlikely to share any passion for the kind of “totalitarian” project many of Evo's harshest critics fear. And it's likely that legislators like her will act as constraints on Evo's government. Moreover, as the MAS tent has grown to include social groups ranging from landless peasants to urban indigenous day laborers to urban professionals to middle class intellectuals it has stretched itself in various directions. This may prove a challenge in corralling votes for different policies. 4. The new “federalized” Bolivia changes the game significantly Yesterday's vote also saw all of Bolivia's nine departments approve regional autonomy. The Media Luna departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando) already did so in 2005 (and again in the 2008 “wildcat” referendums). But now the Andean departments (La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosi, and Chuquisaca) did so as well. And by overwhelming numbers: 78% in La Paz, 79% in Potosi, 84% in Chuquisaca, 79% in Cochabamba, and 73% in Oruro. These are almost reverse, polar images of these departements' votes in 2005. This time, of course, MAS actively campaigned in favor of autonomy. It's interesting to note that pro-autonomy votes exceeded the votes for autonomy in the Media Luna in 2005 (the highest then was Beni w/ 73%). This suggests that Bolivian voters have come to embrace the idea of regional autonomy. No doubt they have a different kind of autonomy in mind, perhaps. But more likely this has been a question of reframing the autonomy debate. Nevertheless, the country now has constitutionally recognized autonomous departments. And this transforms Bolivian politics. In April 2010, voters across Bolivia will go to the polls to elect new municipal governments, as well as their first ever departmental governments (governors and regional legislators). This has important implications. It means the next four months (January to April) will force MAS (and the opposition) to act w/ electoral considerations in mind. This will impact how “departmental brigades” (as departmental caucuses are called) behave. And that impact will be strongest in the Senate. Evo now has to calculate whether moving quickly to secure policy goals helps or hurts his party's chances in local elections, which will be seen as a plebiscite on his administration. Additionally, voters in Gran Chaco (comprising three municipalities in Tarija) voted for their own “regional” autonomy. It's still very unclear what that means (in practical terms), especially since voters there won't get to elect their own “regional” authorities until 2015. But it suggests that Bolivia's political system is about to get even more complicated. Municipalities are now also “autonomous” (according to the constitution), so this mid-level “regional” autonomy sits uncomfortably between departmental, municipal, and indigenous autonomy (all of which seem to be “co-equal,” constitutionally). The bottom line is that all parties—especially parties in power—will face pressures from local politics like never before. This is part of a growing tendency since the mid-1990s (w/ municipal decentralization & electoral system reforms). But now there's a new, more complicated layer. 5. The “exterior” vote wasn't decisive, but could become so in the future At first glance it doesn't seem like voters in Spain, the US, Brazil, or Argentina made a significant impact, one way or another. Like the rest of Bolivians, they backed Evo (the only voted for president). ~~They also backed him by slightly larger numbers: 69% for Evo over 25% for Manfred.~~ [Edit 12/08: It now seems like voters in the US went for Manfred over Evo 71-30, and that the total international vote was closer to the Bolivia tally. But these numbers all could change, as official counts come in.] But these voters could be decisive in future elections. A total of 170,000 voters cast ballots outside Bolivia. That's three times the current population of Pando (60,000) & half the population of Oruro (385,000). If the number of Bolivians voting in the exterior increases (and it's likely to, both by rising migration & increasing the number of international polling places), they could really prove decisive if they break substantially from how voters in Bolivia cast their ballots. 6. Not everyone wants indigenous autonomy Not much can be said about this, yet, based on early vote counts. But it seems that at least two of the municipalities that had a chance to vote for “indigenous autonomy” (which is somehow different from regular municipal autonomy) & opted to reject that symbolic move. Those were Charagua (in Santa Cruz) & Carahuara (in Oruro). No one yet seems to know what, if anything, that means. But it does suggest that indigenous voters are more complex (and therefore human) than they're often portrayed. 7. The old party system is dead, long live the new populists None of the traditional parties even competed in the election. This suggests that populism (a form of non-institutionalized, personality-driven politics) is the new norm in Bolivia. Even MAS is currently dominated by a single figure (Evo) and seems unlikely to become an institutionalized party system able to present an internal transition. This was the death knell of Bolivia's traditional parties, which were led by single caudillos for their entire history. Only the MNR managed a transition, but that was in 1988 after Victor Paz Estenssoro held a firm grip on the party since the 1940s. And then the transition was to Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (Goni), who led the party for two decades (until 2004). If Evo is serious about running for reelection in 2015, that postpones an internal transition w/in MAS. That would only continue Bolivia's tradition of populist caudillos, which has not been a good track record. If MAS is serious about a lasting process of change, it needs to prepare a second generation of leaders who can take over after Evo. The real victory for Evo in 2015 would be not to win reelection by 70% (as he suggests he hopes to do), but to ensure that someone else from MAS succeeds him in a smooth transition. That would truly make his reforms “irreversible.” 8. It's the economy, stupid Finally, Bolivia's economy has some troubling signs as the global recession continues to take its toll. Yes, the economy has grown (as many Evo supporters are often quick to point out). But that growth isn't all it's cracked up to be. First, because that growth has been primarily based on raw material exports, continuing a tradition that goes back centuries (and one highly susceptible to boom/bust cycles). Second, because that growth isn't that much better than in the early 1990s. From 1993 to 1998, economic growth was consistently between 4-5% per year (see chart). It was only in 1999 that the economy entered recession. But throughout that period, GDP growth was outstripped by inflation (see data). Last year, inflation hit 14%, far outstripping the 6.1% GDP growth rate. The 2009 growth rate is currently pegged at only 2.8%. If the economy begins to falter, that will put strains on Evo's government, which has already used bank reserves to doll out payments to children, mothers, and pensioners. These are all valuable, worthwhile programs. But they're expensive. And now they're viewed as entitlements, which means any incumbent government will be punished if it's unable to continue to deliver (or even expand) them. Moreover, the longer the recession continues in the US & Europe—and the Dubai financial mess is a troubling sign of things to come—the less money will be available for both critically needed donor aid & foreign investment. For all his symbolic rhetoric, Evo is still actively courting foreign investors. If the economy makes them increasingly risk-averse, we may see a recession hit Bolivia. Of course, rising economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China) may pick up the slack. But that's always a gamble. It would be better to have a larger number of options, not fewer. The bottom line, however, is that Bolivia is not really charting a new “socialist” course, per se. It's following the 1952 MNR playbook, pursuing a political strategy of multi-class alliance & an economic strategy of “state capitalism.” It's banking on a state-driven economic sector to grow, keeping the middle class happy while also securing better standards of living for the poor. It was the failure of the state capitalism model to deliver that led to an experiment w/ neoliberalism. Another failure of state capitalism could leave Bolivia primed, yet again, for another neoliberal episode. Conclusions Overall, this was a good day for Bolivia. By all accounts the election was free & fair. Evo has led MAS to yet another electoral victory, gaining greater legitimacy for his political project. However, neither the entrenched opposition nor the die-hard believers should read too much into this victory. Evo won (as he does before most elections) by moving closer to the center & appealing to key sectors of the middle class for support. This means that hislegislative majority is more heterogeneous than many suspect. April will be the big test. By then, voters will be voting on more “bread & butter” issues, rather than on the symbolism of Evo & a continuation of a “process of change.” In April, voters are more likely to vote on local issues that may divide even avid MAS supporters (at the national level). And whether the economy stalls or continues to grow will also play a major role.]]>

Pre-election analysis

2009-12-05T18:32:08Z

Today’s La Razón has a nice breakdown of options this election. In some ways, this will be the most complicated Bolivian election to date Yet—for most voters—it will be little different from their 2005 vote.]]> before voting whether they will vote for indigenous or “uninominal” representative (they’ll then be given the corresponding ballot). Voters in another 150 precincts will only be allowed to vote for indigenous representatives (as well as for president). This is where things can get interesting. Most voters casting ballots for “indigenous” representatives are likely to support the MAS-backed option. But this means that such districts could allow for opposition “uninominal” candidates to win in those districts. This might matter, since uninominal candidates need only a simple plurality to win. I’m going to keep my eye on those uninominal districts (which will encompass a mix of “mixed” & non-indigenous precincts). Additionally, a number of voters will see other options on their menu. Voters throughout the departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba, and Chuquisaca will have the ability to vote (yet again) for regional autonomy (they did so in 2005). Voters in Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando won’t have that option, since they voted for autonomy in 2005. This time—w/ MAS doing an about face & throwing its weight behind autonomy—voters in the five Andean departments are expected to approve autonomy by hefty margins (60-70% or more). A few select voters will have yet another option. Voters in Tarija’s Gran Chaco province (made up three municipalities: Yacuiba, Villamontes, and Caraparí) will vote on their own regional autonomy. While voters in 12 other municipalities in Chuquisaca (Huacaya, Tarabuco, Villa de Mojocoya), La Paz (Charazani, Jesús de Machaca), Oruro (Chipaya, San Pedro de Totora, Pampas Aullagas, Salinas de Garci Mendoza, Curahuara de Carangas), Potosí (Chayanta), and Santa Cruz (Charagua) will decide whether they want to switch from the status of “municipality” to a constitutionally recognized autonomous indigenous territory. The second vote (for indigenous recognition) is mostly symbolic. Already in 1994, the Popular Participation Law (LPP) gave municipalities the right to define themselves as indigenous communities. And the new 2009 constitution recognizes municipal autonomy across the country. The first vote has more unclear consequences. The 2009 constitution allows for “regional” autonomy at an intermediate level between department & municipality. But this could also be the transition into a new department. If so, would bordering chaqueño municipalities in Chuquisaca & Santa Cruz want to join? This could be a real issue, because while most of Bolivia’s natural gas is found in Tarija, most of that is actually located in Gran Chaco (w/ significant deposits in other chaqueño municipalities in Santa Cruz & Chuquisaca. MAS victories there could serve as a flanking maneuver around opposition-dominated department governments in Tarija, Chuquisaca, and Santa Cruz. Finally, the last complication is the role of overseas voters. Under Evo, Bolivia’s government has made a concerted push to facilitate voting by Bolivian citizens living overseas. Voting precincts will open in Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia), the US (the Washington, DC area), Argentina (Jujuy, Mendoza, Buenos Aires), and Brazil (São Paulo). These voters will only be able to vote for president. Overseas voters have not been polled, and there’s enough of them to make an impact if their preferences differ significantly from those of Bolivians at home. It’s still pretty obvious that Evo will win. It’s also almost certain that he won’t be forced into a second round runoff. The only question is how the legislature will look. Currently, MAS has a majority in the House of Deputies, but the opposition controls the Senate. MAS will certainly keep control over the lower house. The question is whether it’s votes—across the departments—will be enough for it to wrest control of the Senate away from the opposition. Evo’s rise in the polls over the past few weeks suggest that this is very real possibility. If so, it’ll be largely due to a failure of the opposition to coordinate behind a single candidate. Manfred has been successful at firing up the die-hard anti-Evo opponents (and even winning over some, but not most, moderates). But a more moderate candidate like Samuel Doria Media or Víctor Hugo Cárdenas might have done much better. Of course, it’s all speculation now.

Bolivian presidential election polls

2009-12-05T14:52:48Z

]]> lower than his approval rating (which has been on par w/ how he did in the recall referendum), 2) electoral support for Evo has increased from earlier this year (in part a function of shrinking undecideds but also efforts to appeal to middle class moderates), and 3) electoral support for Evo (according to polls) is about where he was in 2005. If these numbers hold up, it will mean that MAS has been unable to expand its electorate from 2005. It will, however, mean that MAS has consolidated its electorate. Of course, new seat apportionment rules will likely benefit MAS in the legislative contest. But the various autonomies will make Bolivia more difficult to govern—for any president. More tomorrow, after vote counts start coming in.

Spring 2010 Syllabi

2009-12-01T20:43:33Z

In other news, I’ve (finally) posted my Spring 2010 syllabi: • POL 102. Introduction to Comparative Politics • INST 314. Heroes & Villains: Populism in Latin America • LIBA 102. Travel as a Method of Inquiry I’ve also updated my cv, in case anyone’s interested.

Bolivia’s (boorish) election

2009-12-01T20:36:26Z

It’s been more than a month since my last update. Wow. Partly, a lot of my short, running commentary has now moved almost entirely to Twitter. But I’ve also just been keeping my head down working on a number of projects. I’ll try to remember to set some time aside for more posts, both personal & otherwise. Angus Reid has been posting polls on relatively regular basis. But these are national aggregate reportings, not the kind of stuff that’s helpful. Why? Because what really matters in this election is whether MAS wins control over the Senate. All national polls do is confirm that, yes, Evo still leads by 20-30 points over Manfred. Only yesterday did La Razón finally post another IPSOS poll w/ regional breakdowns. Surprisingly, Evo has become more competitive in the Media Luna than I had expected. MAS (Evo) is now virtually tied w/ PPB-CN (Manfred) in Santa Cruz & Pando w/ roughly a third of the vote. The latter is not surprising, since Evo’s government recently moved thousands of peasants to the sparsely populated battleground department. MAS is also only slightly behind PPB-CN in Beni. Most surprising, however, is the news that MAS is leading in the polls in Tarija. Now, polls are tricky, especially in Bolivia. But if those numbers hold (there are still a lot of undecideds out there), along w/ the hefty MAS leads in the Andean departments, Evo might not only wrest control of the Senate away from the opposition, but even impose on it a 2/3 supermajority! Clearly, the failure of the opposition to put together a single electoral platform was a disaster. There are nine departments, each (under the new constitution) w/ four Senate seats. The way the new electoral rules work, the plurality winner could get all four seats, depending on the margin of victory. So far it looks like MAS could win most of the seats in six of nine departments. Even if MAS only won 3 of 4 seats (on average) in those six (La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Cochabamba, Tarija, and Chuquisaca), that would give it 23 seats. If MAS manages to win (on average) 2 seats in Santa Cruz & Pando, and only 1 seat in Beni, that would give MAS a total of 28 seats. That would translate to a 3/4 supermajority. None of that might matter too much, however. Why? Because the new constitution transitions Bolivia into a semi-federal state (a centralized state w/ protected autonomies). The newly formed autonomous governments would include a governor (no longer called “prefect”) & a legislative body. Of course, MAS could try to use its supermajority to rescind autonomy. But that seems unlikely to happen, since voters in Andean departments are now also preparing to approve autonomy in a referendum. (Voters in the Media Luna approved autonomy in 2006 & in their own 2008 “wildcat” referendums.) The second reason I don’t like this campaign is that there’s been no debate. Prior to 2005 (there was no debate that year, too) Bolivian campaigns had (since 1989) established a tradition of holding presidential debates. These televised debates gave voters a chance to see the various candidates answer a host of questions from a moderator, as well as answer each other’s questions. Instead, now it’s just rallies, television & radio spots, and graffiti. That reduces political discourse to the lowest possible common denominator. I hope debates will one day again be part of Bolivian campaigns. Fundamentally, the sense I get from Bolivia’s election is that the country is limping along. It’s not in a stable, consolidated position like Uruguay. Nor is it in an absolute crisis like Honduras. Both countries had elections last Sunday. In Uruguay, it was a second-round election that gave Mujica (a former leftist guerrilla) the presidency. But this won’t send a shockwave through Washington. Mujica is an old leftist, who’s turned to democracy long before the 1990s. Morever, he’s succeeding another leftist in Uruguay (Tabare Vasquez) who was one of America’s closest friends in the region (it signed an FTA deal). In Honduras, the election came in the midst of a dragged out crisis following a military-backed coup of Mel Zelaya, a friend of Chavez. Hardly any government will recognize the Honduras election, which will just prolong the crisis. But its also clear that no one will do anything about it (not Obama, not Chavez, no Lula). So there you have it. My take on the Bolivian election is that it’s primarily been a boorish (though not necessarily boring) affair. I still plan to write a paper about it, of course, for April’s MPSA. But most of that will have to wait for actual election results. That means roughly a week from now.]]>

Bolivia pre-electoral update

2009-10-27T20:52:10Z

Some new pre-electoral polls in Bolivia came out over the last few days, including a new Ipsos poll in today’s La Razón. All the polls make clear that Evo is almost certainly going to win reelection. The only question is whether he will increase his vote share (his “popular mandate”) from 2005 & whether MAS will be able to gain control of the Bolivian Senate (opposition parties currently hold a two-seat advantage).]]> So far, the campaigns have taken some interesting twists. Although MAS was able to (forcefully) reassert control over El Alto, a protest there last week by the city’s mayor (over the government’s decision to cut municipal funding) & FEJUVE (the federation of neighborhood associations) showed a potential disaffection w/ Evo from his strongest base of support. Coupled w/ growing murmurs of discontent among indigenous leaders (some of which dissipated after MAS appointee candidates resigned to make way for grass-roots indigenous candidates), this suggested potential slackening of support for Evo Morales from the La Paz altiplano, his strongest bastion of support since 2005. The El Alto situation still isn’t fully resolved. The mayor in question is, Fanor Nava, whose political trajectory took him from MIR to PP (the party of former El Alto mayor José Luis Paredes, a current Manfred ally) to MAS (when he & five other PP municipal council members defected to join MAS). The trajectory (shared by many in the MAS ranks) led Evo to denounce the move as “prebendalism,” claiming that Nava & FEJUVE were being manipulated by “political” interests (i.e. because of Nava’s former membership in PP, now PPB, Manfred’s political banner). But after Nava resigned (as did the FEJUVE president, who went into hiding), the El Alto municipal council was unable to select a new mayor from among three contenders. Yesterday, Nava w/drew his resignation, arguing that he counts on the support of FEJUVE. This could be a potential problem for Evo, since FEJUVE is widely recognized as the most potent social force in Bolivia. As the backbone of “the El Alto street,” FEJUVE’s mobilizations in the past were key in forcing the resignations of Goni (in October 2003) & Mesa (in June 2005). Meanwhile, the announcement that a faction of the UJC (the Santa Cruz regionalist semi-paramilitary opposition group that, until recently, was regularly attacking MAS supporters) had signed an agreement to support Evo’s candidacy (along w/ the fan organization for two Santa Cruz soccer teams: Oriente Petrolero & Blooming) was an interesting twist (see story). The UJC & soccer fan clubs (“barras bravas”) are instrumental in mobilizing young cruceño/camba men into the streets. It’s perhaps ironic both that they’ve signed a political pact w/ Evo, and that the leaders of the Santa Cruz regionalist movement now denounce them as being manipulated for political purposes (“prebendalism”?). Still, the election polls are becoming interesting. I’ve stated before that I thought Evo would win comfortably, just as he did in 2005. All signs suggest that he has the support of at least a slim majority of the Bolivian population. And, as in the 2005 campaign, he’s attempting to shore up that support among the middle classes. But for the election to be more than a pyrrhic victory, Evo needs to do two things: increase his vote share from 2005 (win by more than 54%) and gain control over the Senate. Despite some gains (for both government & opposition) over the last four years, the political situation in Bolivia can best be described as a stalemate. And given that 2010 (when Evo & the new legislature would be sworn in) will introduce a more decentralized political system, failure to move the ball forward would leave Evo & MAS exposed. What makes the latest Ipsos poll interesting, is that it points to a growing polarization. Currently, Evo is polling highs of 72% in La Paz & 73% in Oruro. That would give him clear, crushing victories in two departments, increasing his support from 2005 (67% in La Paz & 63% in Oruro). But this is matched by significant decrease in Santa Cruz (polling 22% now; compared to 33% in 2005) & Chuquisaca (polling 47% now; 54% in 2005). Still, Evo has made some interesting gains in Beni (polling 26%; up from 16% in 2005) & Pando (polling 35%; up from 21% in 2005). In every place where Evo is polling less than 50% he is either trailing Manfred or holding a thin lead (as in Tarija, where Evo & Manfred are virtually tied, w/ SDM holding third place). But in Tarija, where Evo’s 31% polling lead beats Manfred (28%) by 3 points, he is par w/ his performance in 2005 (32%). In these close races, the undecideds will tip the balance. Pando, of course, is the surprise. After moving thousands of new residents (and troops, who registered as residents for the election) into Pando, he has moved it into the MAS column, but only barely. The poll shows Evo leading Manfred in Pando by only 3 points (35-32); here again the undecideds could tip the balance, but this will be the contest to watch. There’s every indication that Evo will win. And his victory will be facilitated by a divided, disorganized opposition (and w/ no new faces). But I see no indication—yet—that Evo has actually expanded his support. If the opposition can somehow gain momentum, picking up some undecideds (which still make up 11% of respondents in Bolivia), it could prevent MAS from winning control over the senate. At the same time, as tensions w/in the MAS coalition continue, these could become a new source of worry for Evo, who has to ensure that he can shut out the opposition from winning any senate seats in La Paz & Oruro.

Catching up on Tuesday

2009-10-20T20:46:56Z

The weeks are quickly ticking by, and I’ve been focusing mostly on my teaching workload, though trying to transition myself to get some more research, writing, and editing time. Javi’s fever last night meant I lost most of today, though I think I managed to hold some solid ground (K8 let me work this morning; I took him in the afternoon, which is mostly nap time). Ole Miss is slowly winding down. I hope to post a long reflection on that later, as I start to deconstruct what worked & what didn’t in this new context. Particularly regarding my first-year seminar (LIBA 102), which I’m redesigning for next semester to both more useful for students & hold more “realistic” expectations (I’m regularly surprised by the kinds of skills my students need that I take for granted). I’m also applying some classroom experience as I redesign my populism course, which I’m teaching for Croft in the spring. Meanwhile, you can check out two pieces of my recent handiwork. The first is book review that just came out in America’s Quarterly. I wrote a brief review of a collection of interviews w/ Alvaro Garcia Linera (Bolivia’s vp). To access the review, click here. Despite the book’s many flaws, I think it’s one worth picking up, especially if you want to better understand AGL (sometimes referred to as “Evo’s brain”). The other is just a little slideshow I’ve prepared for tomorrow’s class, which kicks off a 5-week series on Latin America’s “left turn.” It’s become clear that my students prefer lectures, and need them in order to make sense of information. I also suspect that students may want to know that can use technology & give a “canned” lecture (an important thing if I want to strategically think about teaching evals). I’ll see if incorporating more audio/visual materials will kick-start better class discussions. Although I am pleasantly surprised by how well students are doing on exams, considering the low level of in-class discussion.

Latin America's Shift to the Left

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The students are (supposed to be) reading through Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left (Castañeda & Morales, 2008), and so this is meant to give them some essential background. I also wanted to put Latin America’s various lefts in comparative perspective, so the last slide shows the logos of various European social democratic parties. See if you can identify them!]]>

Bolivia election update

2009-10-08T22:28:07Z

I know I’ve been slacking on my Bolivia pre-election coverage. I’m still tuning in, of course (posting regularly to ). But the combination of a hectic teaching/research schedule (some of that’s now relieved) & an upcoming personal revelation (we are pregnant again!) limited my time. Also, not much was really happening. Bolivian elections often resemble Bravo reality shows (and not quality ones like Top Chef, more the Real Housewives variety). So a lot of drama, w/o much substance.]]> obras). That goes for both government & opposition, and for all levels of government (national, department, and municipal). The announcement (see story in La Razón) was clearly meant to limit incumbents (both government & opposition candidates) from using “works” for clientelistic practices (a time-honored tradition not only in Latin America, but around the world). Fair enough. But I’m not really sure how practical the ruling is. How does one distinguish between an incumbent “campaigning” for office or just “doing their job” by showing up to present a new public work. Obviously, all public works have electoral consequences, so incumbents will seek to publicize them as much as possible. Does the CNE really believe Evo, Costas, Savina, or any of the various ministers, prefects/governors, legislators, or mayors backing candidates will stop producing public works for their constituents for the next two months? If not, how will the CNE determine whether Evo (who’s running for reelection) is visiting Camiri to present a new road as head of state or as candidate? Or what about determining whether Savina (Chuquisaca’s prefect) is announcing a new departmental health initiative as prefect or as a public ally of an opposition candidate? Back to the “drama” side of things, here’s a quick rundown of the last few days: Mallku (Felipe Quispe), the firebrand indigenous leader, has challenged Evo to a debate in Aymara (Evo has stated that, as in previous elections, he doesn’t plan to debate anyone, in any language). Leopoldo will remain in prison (awaiting trial) while he runs for the vice presidency. A minor party (MUSPA) declared Nagatani (the 2005 MNR presidential candidate) as its VP candidate; Nagatani clarified that this was not the case. UN’s Doria Media accuses Manfred’s PPB coalition of trying to snipe its candidates (by asking them to resign their candidacies, to back Manfred’s presidential run). Everywhere, MAS supporters hassle opposition candidates; and vice versa. A group of young students from other countries (mostly in Latin America) campaigned for Evo in Santa Cruz, on their way to visit Che’s burial cite in Valle Grande (a popular tourist attraction). While most parties launched their campaigns in La Paz, only MAS launched its campaign in Santa Cruz (huh?). All the while, of course, various protests shut down large swaths of La Paz on a regular basis. There’s more, of course. But that’s the gist of it. Meanwhile, Evo is still up (and gaining) in recent polls. The surprise is that while he’s up nationwide, his electoral support has actually declined in La Paz & El Alto, but has increased in Santa Cruz. This may be a clever electoral strategy. Evo doesn’t need 90% support levels (as he used to have) in La Paz & El Alto to win most of the region’s seats. So losses there, if offset by significant gains in Santa Cruz may very well be worth it. I’m going to be particularly interested to see how votes shift at the rural municipal level this election.

Party ticket likeability polls in Bolivia

2009-09-13T14:38:55Z

A new Mori poll just came out today in El Deber. The poll’s interesting, even if it doesn’t tell us much about voter intent (it was a poll asking respondents to rate tickets on a good/regular/bad three-point scale).]]> According to the poll, 55% of respondents rated the MAS ticket (Evo Morales & Alvaro Garía Linera) as “good,” w/ only 21% rating it as “bad.” This suggests that Evo/MAS has high support, consistent w/ previous polls. What’s interesting, is the difference between the PPB-CN & UN ratings. Respondents were more likely to view the PPB-CN ticket (Manfred Reyes Villa & Leopoldo Fernández) as “good” (30%) than the UN ticket (24%). This is consistent w/ previous (but now outdated by new developments) polls that showed Manfred as the most popular opposition challenger. But the other side of the coin is that more respondents rated Manfred/Leopoldo as a “bad” ticket (48%) than the SDM/Helbing ticket (27%). So while Manfred/Leopoldo are more likely to be liked by some opposition voters (their core supporters), they are also more likely to be disliked by half the electorate. Not surprisingly, this shows how polarizing the Manfred/Leopoldo ticket is. In other words, the Manfred/Leopoldo ticket seems to be the clear Condorcet loser. The only other ticket to receive enough responses to merit attention was AS (René Joaquino & Charles Suarez) w/ a fair mix of good/bad responses. Joaquino has an uphill battle to climb in voter intention polls, but he’s clearly less polarizing than Manfred/Leopoldo. Other candidates were included in the poll, but received many more “no responses” than anything useful, making it clear that voters are almost unaware of these candidates. Unless they can fire up the imagination, it does seem that MAS, UN, and PPB-CN will dominate the election, w/ AS as a potential spoiler.

Comments in Inter-American Dialogue newsletter

2009-09-11T23:25:50Z

The Latin American Advisor, which has a regular Q&A feature. This week’s question was: “Is Bolivia’s President Evo Morale a Shoo-In for Re-Election?” You can read the issue here.]]> The other comments are from: Jim Schultz, director of The Democracy Center; Iván Rebolledo, president of the Bolivian-American Chamber of Commerce; and George Gray Molina, from the London School of Economics & Princeton.